Book Review [Alexander Meiklejohn, Teacher of Freedom] by Santa Clara Law Review
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 23 | Number 1 Article 10
1-1-1983
Book Review [Alexander Meiklejohn, Teacher of
Freedom]
Santa Clara Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Santa Clara Law Review, Book Review, Book Review [Alexander Meiklejohn, Teacher of Freedom], 23 Santa Clara L. Rev. 339 (1983).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol23/iss1/10
BOOK REVIEW
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, TEACHER OF FREEDOM. Ed. Cynthia
Stokes Brown. Berkeley, CA: Meiklejohn Institute. 198. Pp. ix
+ 281. Hardcover. $13.95.
Reviewed by Paul N. Halvonik*
In 1948, at the age of 76, Alexander Meiklejohn published
a 107 page book of political philosophy, Free Speech and its
Relation to Self-Government;' the first amendment has not
looked the same since. Free Speech has an enormous impact
on the constitutional law of the United States, an impact
which has not been universally welcomed. Felix Frankfurter,
for example, suggested that Meiklejohn would be better
equipped to handle these weighty questions were he to spend
three years in law school. Meiklejohn was game, provided
Frankfurter spend three years in a school of philosophy.'
Cynthia Stokes Brown's book contains a short biography
of Alexander Meiklejohn followed by a collection of
Meiklejohn's writing% not currently available elsewhere.
Neither the biography nor the short notes that precede the
Meiklejohn selections are evaluative. Ms. Brown gives us the
context of Meiklejohn's work, edits some of it, and leaves us
to draw our own conclusions. It is an excellent piece of
editing.
Alexander Meiklejohn was born on February 3, 1872, in
Rochdale,. England, of a Scottish family. His father, James,
was a textile worker; Rochdale is where the consumer coopera-
tive movement began in 1844.3 Meiklejohn was, throughout
his life, concerned with the cause of labor and skeptical about
the virtue of capitalism. His concerns about capitalism were
ethical not Marxist: "The essential defeat of the capitalist or-
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1. A. M IKLRJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
2. C. BROWN, ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN: TEACHER OF FREEDOM 46-47 (1981).
3. Id. at 1.
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der is, in my opinion, that it is revolting as a form of human
behavior. It makes the men who engage in it ashamed of
themselves."
4
In 1880, James Meiklejohn was transferred to Pawtucket,
Rhode Island. Nine years later, he became an American citi-
zen and so, consequently, did his son. This shift of allegiance
from the Queen of England to the government of the people
had a profound effect on the younger Meiklejohn, as a similar
shift has profoundly influenced the framers of the Constitu-
tion.5 College would have been foreclosed to the son of a work-
ing class family, except for the happy accident that
Meiklejohn had seven older brothers who pooled their re-
sources to send the promising scholar to Brown University.
Brown was only four miles away and Meiklejohn was able to
live at home while he attended.
At Brown, Meiklejohn was an outstanding student and an
outstanding athlete. A member of the first collegiate ice polo
team in the United States, he brought back from Canada a
rubber puck to replace the ball, turning the game from ice
polo into ice hockey.' After obtaining a master's degree in phi-
losophy at Brown, Meiklejohn obtained his Ph.D. at Cornell,
supporting himself with a hockey scholatship while writing his
dissertation on Kant's theory of substance. Meiklejohn re-
turned to Brown as a member of the faculty in 1897. In 1901,
Meiklejohn was appointed Dean of Brown8 and in 1912, at the
age of 40, he became President of Amherst.9 As President of
Amherst, Meiklejohn emphasized the importance of the open
and inquisitive mind. After a decade of Meiklejohn's adminis-
tration, Amherst's Board of Trustees decided that a good
many minds had become too open and inquisitive, and in
1923, he resigned under pressure. At an alumni lunch on the
following day, Meiklejohn concluded his remarks with this ob-
servation: "I differ from you on most of the issues of life, and
I shall keep it up." 10
4. Id. at 41-42 (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, WHAT DoEs AMERICA MEAN? 242
(1935)).
5. C. BROWN, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 19.
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In 1927, Meiklejohn became director of an experimental
college at the University of Wisconsin. It was a college in
which the students lived as well as studied together. Their
first year was devoted to the study of Athenian civilization in
the 5th century B.C., and their second year, by contrast, to
the civilization of the United States of the 19th and 20th cen-
turies." By any conventional standards, the experimental col-
lege was a complete success. For example, the Scholastic Apti-
tude Test scores of regular Wisconsin freshmen was 57.6,
while the average score of freshman at the experimental col-
lege was 80.3.2 The experimental college ended in 1932, a vic-
tim of the Depression and the customary uneasiness generated
by Meiklejohn's cultivation of the open and inquisitive mind.
In the summer of 1932, Meiklejohn moved to Berkeley,
California, where he was to live until his death in 1964.1a
While in Berkeley, Meiklejohn started the San Francisco
School for Social Studies, 4 co-founded the American Civil
Liberties Union of Northern California,/ served as consultant
to St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland,' 6 lectured at the
University of California, 7 and in 1962 at the age of ninety,
became Chairman of the National Committee to Abolish the
House Un-American Activities Committee. 8 In Berkeley,
Meiklejohn also committed to paper his conception of an
American political philosophy.' In What Does America
Mean?10 Meiklejohn proposed that America is about people
and not about property. Property may be regulated for the
common good, but the conscience, thoughts, and beliefs of
people cannot be regulated for the common good or for any
other reason. It was the latter point that he refined in Free
Speech."
The first amendment, Meiklejohn noted, does not protect
speech, it protects freedom of speech. It is permissible, and
11. Id. at 23.
12. Id. at 30.
13. Id. at 35, 54.
14. Id. at 36.
15. Id. at 47.
16. Id. at 49.
17. Id. at 48.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id. at 40.
20. A. MEIKLFJOHN, supra note 4, at 127-37.
21. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1.
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probably essential, to regulate many forms of speech. There
are crimes, such as fraud and solicitation for murder, that are
accomplished exclusively by speech and yet no rational person
supposes that punishing those crimes offends the first amend-
ment. Freedom of speech, on the other hand, is quite another
matter.
When discussion turns to public matters, the first amend-
ment takes hold. Whether the Constitution should be aban-
doned, whether a socialist economy is a fruitful political de-
vice, whether people should be segregated racially, speech
concerning all of these messages is protected, and protected
absolutely, by the first amendment. These are ideas; the sov-
ereign cannot have ideas interdicted if the sovereign function
is to be performed, and in this country, the people are sover-
eign. Meiklejohn shifted the emphasis of the first amendment
from the speaker to the audience: "The point of ultimate in-
terest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the
hearers."'22 That is because the hearers are the government.
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide
an issue are denied acquaintance with information or
opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant
to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered,
ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mu-
tilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is di-
rected. The principle of the freedom of speech springs
from the necessities of the program of self-government. It
is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a
deduction from the basic American agreement that public
issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.' s
Meiklejohn's theory of free speech was imbedded in our
constitutional law when, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"
the Supreme Court proscribed libel suits by public officials
absent a demonstration of malice, thus removing the under-
pinnings from the law of seditious libel. Harry Kalven, first
22. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 25.
23. Id. at 26-27. The first amendment's author, James Madison, made a similar
point: "If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government
over the people." Annals of Congress, 3C, 2S, 934 (Nov. 27, 1794) (cited in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964)).
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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amendment scholar and Professor of Law at the University of
Chicago, discussed the decision with Meiklejohn and reports
that Meiklejohn called it "an occasion for dancing in the
streets." Kalven added, "As always, I am inclined to think he
is right."2
Kalven may have been inclined to think Meiklejohn right,
but he was willing to suspend his inclination when he spotted
a troublesome aspect of the Meiklejohn doctrine. There are,
Kalven noted, a number of aspects to what we think of as free
expression that do not seem terribly pertinent to political
questions. "Not all communications are relevant to the politi-
cal process. The people do not need novels or dramas or
paintings or poems because they will be called upon to
vote." 26 Meiklejohn replied that self-government, if it is not to
be an illusion, must be conducted by people used to makingjudgments, people who are "self-educated in the ways of
freedom. '27
Meiklejohn's reply is certainly consistent with the Jeffer-
sonian ideal of a thoughtful and educated people going about
the task of self-government, but it does not, I think, answer
Kalven's objection. When the link between the political pro-
cess and the expression at hand is attenuated, Meiklejohn's
distinction between speech and freedom of speech becomes
very fuzzy. All this means is that Meiklejohn has not given us
a key to all the mysteries of the first amendment. What he
has given us is a powerful analytical tool for isolating some of
government's intrusions on free expression, the sort of intru-
sions that most immediately affront our capacities to act as
citizens. That is no small accomplishment.
25. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 221, n.125 (1964).
26. Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 16
(1960).
27. C. BROWN, supra note 2, at 256 (quoting Meiklejohn The First Amendment
is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245 (1961).
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